

Message Text

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DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:KKURZE
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE
USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
AMEMBASSY MBABANE
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH

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PART TWO OF TWO

PART ONE IS MRN 211288. PART TWO IS MRN 211289

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, US
SUBJECT: TEXT OF THE SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 25 PRESS CONFERENCE.

Q DR. KISSINGER, WOULD YOU SAY, SIR, WHY THE UNITED
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STATES FEELS THAT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL SHOULD NOT SEND FORCES, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A CHAPTER
IN THE UN CHARTER, I BELIEVE, THAT CALLS UPON ALL MEMBERS
OF THE UN TO PROVIDE FORCES IF CALLED UPON TO DO SO.

A. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PARTICULAR PROVISION OF THE CHARTER WHICH YOU MENTIONED SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES. WHEN YOU HAVE A SITUATION IN WHICH EVERAL OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS MAY HAVE CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND WHEN THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS MAY THEMSELVES CONTRIBUTE TO THE TENSION IN THE AREA, IT SEEMS TO US THE ONLY POSSIBLE COURSE IS TO EXCLUDE THE MEMBERS -- THE FORCES OF ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS. IT WOULD BE A DISASTER IF THE MIDDLE EAST, ALREADY SO TORN BY LOCAL RIVALRIES, WOULD NOW BECOME, AS A RESULT OF A UN DECISION, A LEGITIMIZED THEATER FOR THE COMPETITION OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE GREAT NUCLEAR POWERS.

AND THEREFORE IT SEEMED TO US THAT THE POLITICAL PURPOSES WOULD BE BEST SERVED IF ANY INTERNATIONAL FORCE THAT WERE INTRODUCED WERE COMPOSED OF COUNTRIES THAT HAVE NO POSSIBILITY OF THEMSELVES BEING DRAWN INTO RIVALRY AS A RESULT OF BEING.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, IT MAY SEEM OBVIOUS, BUT I WOULD JUST LIKE TO ASK YOU -- IS THE PURPOSE OF THE ALERT WHICH IS NOW GOING ON TO TELL THE SOVIET UNION THAT IF THEY SEND FORCES INTO THE MIDDLE EAST WE WILL DO THE SAME?

A. I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE ABOUT WHAT THE PRESIDENT MET DECIDE TO DO IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WE FERVENTLY HOPE WILL NOT ARISE. IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT TO THREATEN ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE BY UNILATERAL ACTION, WOULD BE A STEP OF IRRESPONSIBILITY THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE IS LIKELY. AND THREFORE, I DO NOT WANT TO SPECULATE WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IF IT SHOULD APPEAR THAT INSTEAD OF BEGINNING AN ERA OF COOPERATION, WE WERE THROWN BACK TO THE CONFRONTATIONS WHICH SOONER OR LATER WILL HAVE TO BE SURMOUNTED -- BECAUSE HUMANITY CANNOT STAND THE ETERNAL CONFLICT OF THOSE WHO HAVE THE CAPACITY TO DESTROY IT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, CAIRO RADIO SAID THAT SUCH AN OFFER OF SOVIET TROOPS FOR ENFORCING THE CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM MOSCOW. HAS SUCH AN OFFER BEEN MADE, AND IF SO, HAVE THE SOVIET TROOPS INDEED BEEN ALERTED, AND ARE THEY ON THE MOVE?

A. WE ARE NOT, OF COURSE, AWARE OF THE DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES UNCLASSIFIED

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THAT MAY GO ON BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE ALSO NOT AWARE OF ANY SOVIET FORCES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED INTO EGYPT. AND WE BELIEVE, AND WE WILL BEND EVERY EFFORT IN THAT DIRECTION, THAT ANY ACTIONS THAT ARE TAKEN BY ANY COUNTRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF UNITED NATIONS DECISIONS.

I WANT TO REPEAT AGAIN* WE DO NOT NOW CONSIDER OURSELVES IN A CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE CONTINUE TO BE PREPARED, AND WE BELIEVE IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE DIRECTION THAT HAS BROUGHT US TO THIS POINT, AND ON WHICH THE PEACE OF THE WORLD DEPENDS.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION

HAS THREATENED UNILATERAL ACTION AND PUSHED THIS CIRCUMSTANCE TO THE BRINK OF CONFRONTATION? DO YOU SEE IT POSSIBLE THAT THEY SAW THE EVENTS OF LAST WEEKEND AS HAVING SO WEAKENED THE PRESIDENT -- HE WAS THREATENED WITH IMPEACHMENT, THAT THEY SAW A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY AND DECIDED TO MOVE?

A. SPECULATION ABOUT MOTIVES IS ALWAYS DANGEROUS. BUT ONE CANNOT HAVE CRISIS OF AUTHORITY IN A SOCIETY FOR A PERIOD OF MONTHS WITHOUT PAYING A PRICE SOMEWHERE ALONG THE LINE.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, FROM A PUBLIC STANDPOINT, UNTIL THIS MORNING THE PUBLIC WOULD HAVE HAD THE BELIEF AND THE VIEW THAT THIS CRISIS WAS IN HAND, THAT THE CEASEFIRE WAS TAKING HOLD. YOU HAVE DECLINED TO DISCUSS THE DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT OF THE SPECIFIC COMMUNICATIONS. BUT WAS THERE PRIOR TO THIS LATEST SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT ANY INDICATION THAT THIS SITUATION MIGHT GO INTO SUCH A DIRECTION?

A. NO, THERE WAS NOT. UNTIL YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WE HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE BASIC DIRECTION THAT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED, AND TO WHICH ALL PARTIES HAD AGREED, WOULD IN FACT BEEN IMPLEMENTED. AND I REPEAT -- WE STILL BELIEVE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE IN THIS DIRECTION. NOBODY CAN GAIN FROM INTRODUCING GREAT POWER RIVALRY, OR FROM COMPOUNDING -- BY COMPOUNDING GREAT POWER RIVALRY. THE OVERRIDING GOAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE BETWEEN THE ARAB NATIONS AND ISRAEL. THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED AND INDEED DETERMINED TO PROMOTE. AND THAT IS THE ISSUE TO WHICH WE SHOULD ADDRESS OURSELVES.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, TO FOLLOW THAT UP, PLEASE, SENATOR JACKSON AMONG OTHERS HAS SAID THAT THIS GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNCLASSIFIED

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OPERATING UNDER WHAT HE CALLED AN ILLUSION OF DETENTE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. CAN YOU BE A LITTLE MORE PRECISE NOW UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

A. MR. LISAGOR, WE HAVE, FROM THE BEGINNING OF THIS ADMINISTRATION, RECOGNIZED THAT THERE IS A -- THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH AN IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ADVERSARY. WE HAVE ALSO BELIEVED THAT WE HAD AN HISTORIC OBLIGATION, PRECISELY IN THESE CONDITIONS OF BEING IN OPPOSITION, TO ATTEMPT TO REMOVE THE DANGERS OF WAR. WE HAVE ALWAYS MADE CLEAR, AND WE HAVE ALWAYS PRACTICED, THAT WE WOULD RESIST ANY FOREIGN POLICY ADVENTURES THROUGH THE MANY CRISES IN THE EARLY PARTS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.

WHERE WE HAVE DIFFERED WITH SOME OF OUR CRITICS, IT WAS IN OUR CONVICTION THAT IT WAS DANGEROUS TO ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF A COUNTRY WITH SUCH A DIFFERENT DOMESTIC STRUCTURE AND SUCH A DIFFERENT IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION.

WE HAVE MAINTAINED THE INTEGRITY OF OUR ALLIES AND THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, WHILE REDUCING THE DANGER OF WAR. AS I SAID IN MY REMARKS, THIS IS A HISTORIC TASK THAT SOMEBODY WILL HAVE TO SOLVE, AND THAT IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL

AMERICANS AND ALL OF MANKIND THAT IT BE SOLVED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

AS FOR THE STATUS OF THE DETENTE, I THINK WE CAN MAKE A BETTER JUDGMENT WHEN WE KNOW WHETHER PEACE HAS TAKEN HOLD. IF THE SOVIET UNION AND WE CAN WORK COOPERATIVELY, FIRST TOWARDS ESTABLISHING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND THEN TOWARDS PROMOTING A DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THEN THE DETENTE WILL HAVE PROVED ITSELF. IF THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN, THEN WE HAVE MADE AN EFFORT -- FOR WHICH WE HAVE PAID NO PRICE--THAT HAD TO BE MADE. AND THEN ONE HAS TO WAIT FOR ANOTHER MOEMENT WHEN THE TASK OF INSURING OR OF BRINGING PEACE TO MANKIND CAN BE ATTEMPTED.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, THE REPORTS OF THIS JOINT -- THE SOVIET PLAN FOR A JOINT SOVIET-U.S. FORCE WERE RATHER WIDESPREAD BEFORE YOU WENT TO MOSCOW, ESPECIALLY IN EASTERN EUROPE. DID MR. BREZHNEV DISCUSS THIS IDEA WITH YOU IN ANY WAY? AND IF NOT, WHY DO YOU THINK HE KEPT QUIET ABOUT IT THEN ONLY TO APPEAR TO ACTIVATE IT A FEW DAYS LATER?

A. I DON'T KNOW WHAT PLANS WERE WIDESPREAD IN EASTERN EUROPE. I CAN ONLY DEAL WITH PLANS WHICH REACH US IN SOME OFFICIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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MANNER. THE PLAN FOR A JOINT U.S.-SOVIET MILITARY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS NEVER BROACHED TO US, EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY, UNTIL YESTERDAY. AND WE IMMEDIATELY MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A FORCE, AND ALSO THAT WE WOULD OPPOSE ANY UNILATERAL MOVES.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, YOU HAVE SAID THAT U.S.-SOVIET AUSPICES MIGHT BE USEFUL IN MOVING THIS ALONG DIPLOMATICALLY. ARE YOU PREPARED PERSONALLY TO PLAY A ROLE IN GETTING THESE TALKS STARTED? AND SECONDLY, HAVE ALL THE PARTIES ACCEPTED THE NECESSITY FOR DIRECT ARAB-ISRAELI TALKS?

A. WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN EQUIALLY CLOSE CONTACT WITH ALL OF THE PARTIES. AND WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF THE PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED THESE TALKS FOR THEM TO START. AND INDEED, AS LATE AS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS TOOK PLACE BETWEEN AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AND ME ABOUT THE SITE, THE PARTICIPATION AND THE PROCEDURES FOR THESE TALKS.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, EARLIER YOU REFERRED TO LEGITIMATE SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IDICATED THAT WE FELT THEY WERE NOT THREATENED THERE. HAVE THE SOVIETS INDICATED THEY AGREE WITH YOUR ASSESSMENT?

A. ON THE BASIS OF THE CONVERSATIONS THAT I HAD WITH GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV AS LATE AS LAST SUNDAY, AND THE COMMUNICATIONS THAT WERE EXCHANGED AFTERWARDS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV, THERE WAS EVERY REASON TO EXPECT THAT WHILE, OF COURSE, OUR INTERESTS WERE NOT CONGRUENT, AND WHILE, OF COURSE, THERE WERE DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH, THAT A CERTAIN PARALLELISM COULD DEVELOP IN THE DIRECTION OF PRODUCING A PERMANENT PEACE. AND THEREFORE I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE, AND WE HAVE NO REASON YET TO ALTER OUR ESTIMATE, THAT THE JOINT USPICES OF WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION SPEAKS CAN YET BE IMPLEMENTED.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, BETWEEN THE TWO CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THAT PERIOD THE ISRAELI FORCES HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY GAINS ON THE GROUND. IS THE UNITED STATES PREPARED TO URGE ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH THE RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS FOR ALL PARTIES TO WITHDRAW TO THE LINES AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST CEASE-FIRE?

A. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED BOTH RESOLUTIONS AND IS TODAY SUPPORTING ANOTHER RESOLUTION CONTAINING SIMILAR PROVISIONS, AS WELL AS A PROVISION FOR AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE DRAWN FROM ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS -- FOR WHICH ALL UNCLASSIFIED

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MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD BE ELIGIBLE EXCEPT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, I NOTICE THAT YOU SAID THE PRESIDENT DECIDED ON THE MILITARY ALERT, AND THAT YOU SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD NO OTHER CHOICE. DID YOU RECOMMEND THIS, OR DID THE PRESIDENT INITIATE THE MILITARY ALERT MATTER, AND DO YOU FEEL THAT IT IS A TOTALLY RATIONAL DECISION?

A. MR. MOLLENHOFF, I HAVE A GENERAL RULE NOT TO PROVIDE A CHECK-LIST OF WHAT ADVICE I GIVE TO THE PRESIDENT. BUT DUE TO THE PARTICULAR IMPLICATIONS OF YOUR REMARK, I MAY SAY THAT ALL OF THE PRESIDENT'S SENIOR ADVISORS -- ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- WERE UNANIMOUS IN THEIR RECOMMENDATION, AS A RESULT OF A DELIBERATION IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT DID NOT HIMSELF PARTICIPATE -- AND WHICH HE JOINED ONLY AFTER THEY HAD FORMED THEIR JUDGMENT -- THAT THE MEASURES TAKEN -- THAT HE IN FACT ORDERED -- WERE IN THE ESSENTIAL NATIONAL INTEREST.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, WOULD YOU SAY WHAT IN YOUR JUDGMENT CHANGED FROM THE PERIOD YESTERDAY WHEN YOU AND AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN WERE TALKING ABOUT PARTICIPATION AND SITE AND SO ON FOR TALKS, AND THE PERIOD LAST NIGHT WHICH LED THE SOVIETS TO TAKE THE ACTION THAT THEY TOOK? WHAT IN YOUR ESTIMATION CHANGED?

A. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT AS OF NOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS OT YET TAKEN ANY IRREVOCABLE ACTION. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT SUCH AN ACTION WILL NOT BE TAKEN.

I REPEAT AGAIN WHAT I HAVE SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS IN THIS PRESS CONFERENCE. WE ARE NOT SEEKING AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONFRONT THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE NOT ASKING THE SOVIET UNION TO PULL BACK FROM ANYTHING THAT IT HAS DONE.

THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PURSUING THE JOINT COURSE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IN THE DIPLOMACY AFTERWARDS IS OPEN. THE MEASURES WE TOOK AND WHICH THE PRESIDENT ORDERED WERE PRECAUTIONARY IN NATURE. THEY WERE NOT DIRECTED AT ANY ACTIONS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN. AND THEREFORE THERE IS NO REASON FOR ANY COUNTRY TO BACK OFF ANYTHING THT IT HAS NOT YET DONE. AS TO THE MOTIVES, I THINK WE SHOULD ASSESS THAT FTER THE CURRENT SITUAIION IS OVER.

Q. MR. SECRETARY --

A. WELL, LET ME GET THIS QUESTION, AND THEN YOU.

Q. SIR, IN THE REASONS THAT PROMPTED THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE
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HIS DECISION, DID ANY OF THOSE REASONS INCLUDE A THREAT AIMED
AGAINST THIS COUNTRY AS OPPOSED TO A THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

A. I REALLY DO NOT THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO GO
INTO THE DETAILS OF THE DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES. WE ARE NOT TALKING
OF THREATS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE AGAINST ONE ANOTHER. WE ARE
NOT TALKING OF A MISSLE CRISIS TYPE SITUATION. WE ARE TALKING
OF A SITUATION WHERE SEVENTY-TWO HOURS AGO WE STILL INTRODUCED
JOINT RESOLUTIONS, WHERE THE NECESSITY FOR A JOINT MOVEMENT
TOWARDS PEACE IS AS REAL NOW AS IT WAS THEN, WHERE THE PRTICIPANTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE EVERYTHING TO GAIN FROM A PERIOD OF QUIET
AND FROM AT LEAST WATCHING OR ATTEMPTING TO SEE WHAT AN AMERICAN
DIPLOMATIC EFFORT CAN PRODUCE. AND THEREFORE WE ARE TALKING
ABOUT A PRECAUTIONARY SITUATION AND NOT AN ACTUAL ONE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT YOU ARE ASKING THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE -- YOU AND THE PRESIDENT -- WHO ARE ALREADY
BADLY SHAKEN BY THE EVENTS OF THE LST WEEK, TO ACCEPT A VERY
DRAMATIC MILITARY ALERT, INVOLVING NUCLEAR FORCES, ON THE BASIS
OF A KIND OF HANDFUL OF SMOKE, WITHOUT TELLING THEM OR US
EXACTLY WHY. IF I UNDERSTOOD YOU EARLIER, YOU SAID THAT WE
HAD DISCOVERED THE ALERT OF SOME SOVIET FORCES, AND WE WERE
DISTURBED BY THE BEHAVIOR APPARENTLY OF SOME PEOPLE THAT
AMERICAN OFFICIALS WERE DEALING WITH. AND THATIS ALL WE
REALLY HAVE TO JUSTIFY THIS ALERT.

NOW, THIS COUNTRY IS PRETTY BADLY SHAKEN RIGHT NOW.
AND I WONDER IF YOU CAN GIVE US ANY MORE INFORMATION THAT WILL
HELP CONVINCE PEOPLE THAT THRE IS SOME SOLID BASIS FOR THE
ACTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN.

A. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO PRESERVE THE PEACE IN VERY DIFFICULT
CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS UP TO YOU LADIES AND GENTLEMEN TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THIS IS THE MOMENT TO TRY TO CREATE A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE
IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY AS WELL. WE HAVE TRIED TO GIVE
YOU AS MUCH INFORMATION AS WE DECENTLY AND SAFELY AND PROPERLY
CAN UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. AS SOON AS THERE IS A CLEAR OUTCOME,
WE WILL GIVE YOU THE FULL INFORMATION. AND AFTER THAT YOU
WILL BE ABLE TO JUDGE WHETHR THE DECISIONS WERE TAKEN HASTILY
OR IMPROPERLY.

THE ALERT HAS BEEN ORDERED IS OF A PRECAUTIONARY NATURE AND
IS NOT OF ANY MAJOR AND IRREVOCABLE -- IT IS NOT IN ANY SENSE
IRREVOCABLE. IT IS WHAT SEEMED TO BE INDICATED BY THE SITUATION.
WE WILL BE PREPARED, HOWEVER, AND I AM CERTAIN WITHIN A WEEK,
TO PUT THE FACTS BEFORE YOU.

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BUT THERE HAS TO BE A MINIMUM OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE SENIOR
OFFICIALS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ARE NOT PLAYING WITH THE
LIVES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, THE CHIEF PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AT

THE MOMENT SEEMS TO BE THE CONCERN BY THE EGYPTIANS FOR THE SAFETY OF ITS THIRD ARMY ON THE EAST BANK OF THE CANAL. ARE THERE ANY STEPS BEING TAKEN TO POSSIBLY AMELIORATE THEIR SITUATION? AND SECONDLY, COULD YOU GIVE US SOME MORE DETAILS ABOUT THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONVERSATION AS TO FORTHCOMING TALKS? ABOUT TWELVE HOURS AGO EVERYBODY WAS WAITING FOR TALKS TO BEGIN. CAN YOU TELL US IN WHICH DIRECTION WE CAN ANTICIPATE THAT WILL GO?

A. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS THAT ARE RAISED BY A CEASE-FIRE IN WHICH THE FORCES ARE DEPLOYED IN SUCH A CURIOUS FASHION -- EACH ARMY HAVING UNITS BEHIND THE LINES OF THE OTHER -- THAT THESE CONDITIONS FIRST OF ALL PRODUCE, ESPECIALLY IN THE INITIAL PHASES, MANY DIFFICULTIES. WE ALSO ARE ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT WITH THE PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS, WITH GOOD WILL ON ALL SIDES, AND WITH THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THAT THE DIFFICULTIES CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY EASED AND EVENTUALLY REMOVED.

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOME HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES REACHED THE THIRD ARMY TODAY.

AND WE WOULD CERTAINLY BE PREPARED TO LEND OUR GOOD OFFICES TO AN EFFORT IN WHICH NEITHER SIDE GAINED A DECISIVE ADVANTAGE AS A RESULT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THEIR FORCES.

I THEREFORE AM CONVINCED THAT THE PARTICULAR CONDITIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE, DIFFICULT AS THEY ARE, CAN BE DEALT WITH AND CAN BE AMELIORATED WITH STATESMANSHIP ON ALL SIDES.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE SURELY TOLD DOBRYNIN AND OTHERS WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD US AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE. CAN YOU GIVE US ANY INDICATION OF WHAT EFFECT THIS HAD ON THESE PEOPLE?

A. WE ARE AT THIS MOMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATING THE RESOLUTION THAT WE ARE SUPPORTING. IF THAT RESOLUTION IS ACCEPTED AND CARRIED OUT, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WILL LEAD TO AN IMMEDIATE EASING OF THE SITUATION AND TO A RESTORATION OF THE CONDITIONS AS WE OBSERVED THEM AT NOON YESTERDAY.

MAY I SAY ALSO THAT THIS PRESS CONFERENCE WAS SCHEDULED AT A TIME BEFORE THIS LATEST EVENT WAS KNOWN OR SUSPECTED. AND I WENT THROUGH WITH IT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE THE EVOLUTION THAT BROUGHT US HERE, AND AS MUCH OF UNCLASSIFIED

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THE REASONING AS I COULD, GIVEN THE DELICACY OF THE SITUATION.

Q. YOU DIDN'T ANSWER THE SECOND HALF OF MY QUESTION,

DR. KISSINGER --

A. WHAT WAS THE SECOND HALF?

Q. ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, WHERE THEY WERE GOING TO GO.

A. WE BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS CAN AND SHOULD BEGIN IN A MATTER OF A VERY FEW WEEKS.

Q. HOW?

A. HOW?

Q. YES. YOU SAID WE WERE DISCUSSING PARTICIPATION AND FORUM.

I WONDERED IF YOU COULD GIVE US MORE DETAILS.

A. I THINK WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE PARTIES ARE PREPARED TO ANNOUNCE THIS.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, HAVE YOU ANY INDICATION OF HOW THE SOVIET UNION WILL VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION TODAY?

A. I THINK THE DEBATE IS STILL IN PROCESS. AND ONCE WE KNOW THE RESULT OF THAT VOTE --

Q. IS THERE ANY INDICATION OF HOW THEY MIGHT VOTE?

A. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION.

Q. IF THE RESOLUTION IS PASSED, DR. KISSINGER, DO YOU EXPECT THE ALERT WULD BETAKEN OFF?

A. THE ALERT WILL NOT LAST ONE MINUTE LONGER THAN WE BELIEVE IS NECESSARY.

Q. DR. KISSINGER --

A. AND IT WOULD BE TAKEN OFF AS SOON AS ANY DANGER OF UNILATERAL ACTION IS REMOVED.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, CONCERNING THE ROLE THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY PLAY IN OBTAINING CONDITIONS FOR AN ENDURING PEACE, SEVERAL MONTHS AGO YOU WERE REPORTED AS SAYING THAT YOU WERE SUPPORTIVE OF AN AMERICAN POLICY THAT SUPPORTS ISRAEL BUT NOT ISRAELI CONQUESTS. WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ON THAT NOW?

A. I THINK I WAS QUOTED TO THAT EFFECT FOUR-AND-A-HALF YEARS AGO, BEFORE I UNDERSTOOD THE SPECIAL NOMENCLATURE THAT IS ATTACHED TO THEVARIOUS GROUND RULES.

OUR POSITION IS -- AS I HAVE STATED PUBLICLY -- THAT THE CONDITIONS THAT PRODUCED THIS WAR WERE CLEARLY INTOLERABLE TO THE ARAB NATIONS, ANDTHAT IN A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS.

THE PROBLEM WILL BE TO RELATE THE ARAB CONCERN FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OVER TERRITORIES TO THE ISREAEILI CONCERN FOR SECURE

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BOUNDARIES.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF THII. AND AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED TO THE FOUR ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND AS WE HAVE STATED REPEATEDLY, WE WILL MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION THAT IS CONSIDERED JUST BY ALL PARTIES. BUT I THINK NO PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY MY TRYING TO DELIMIT THE EXACT NATURE OF ALL OF THESE PROVISIONS.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

(WHEREUPON AT 1:00 P.M. THE PRESS CONFERENCE WAS CONCLUDED.)
KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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MANAMA
NOUAKCHOTT
PEKING
SANAA
VALLETTA

BERN
BRIDGETOWN
DUBLIN
KIGALI
LUXEMBOURG
MBABANE
PORT LOUIS
REYKJAVIK
BANJUL BY POUCH
SUVA BY POUCH

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